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PROTECTING FREE SPEECH IN ELECTIONEERING
COMMUNICATIONS:

FEC V. WiscoNsIN RIGHT To LIFE

Matthew Modell'
In June 2007, the United States Supreme Court ruled in FEC. v.
Wisconsin Right To Life ("WRTL"), by a 5-4 decision, that
section 203 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002
("BCRA") was unconstitutional. The Court's majority, however,
could not agree to why BCRA was unconstitutional. The opinion
by Chief Justice John Roberts held that there is a distinction
between "issue advocacy" and "express advocacy" in the context
of federal elections, and it was constitutionally impermissiblefor
them to be lumped together. The concurring opinion by Justice
Scalia held section 203 never should have been upheld in
McConnell v. FEC, and BCRA is facially unconstitutional. The
effect of the WRTL decision is that corporations and unions may
now broadcast issue ads on television and radio using their
general treasuryfunds in the days leading up to a federalprimary
or general election.
I. INTRODUCTION

Freedom of speech is only free if it is unencumbered from
governmental restrictions. Congress, in its infinite wisdom, has
determined that in order to protect one's right to speak and be
heard in the federal elections process, there must be some
restrictions in the money spent and donated by individuals,
organizations, unions, political action committees (PACs), and
candidates. The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 20022
("BCRA") is Congress' latest attempt to keep "soft money" out of
politics. Section 203 of BCRA bans corporations and unions from
using general treasury funds on radio and television ads within
thirty days of a primary election and within sixty days of a general
' J.D. Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law, 2009.
2 Pub. L. No. 107-155 (2007).
30
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election.' On a facial challenge to this law in McConnell v. FEC,4
the United States Supreme Court upheld this ban. This law was
challenged again in 2003 when a nonprofit corporation, Wisconsin
Right to Life, Inc. ("Life"), challenged this provision of BCRA.
Life believed the McConnell ruling precluded them from running
radio ads advocating for Senators Kohl and Feingold to end the
filibuster against President Bush's judicial nominees. ' Had Life
persisted in trying to air these ads, stations may have refused to air
them. If a station had aired the ads, Life would have potentially
faced criminal charges. 6 In 2008, however, Life will be able to run
these or similar advertisement because of the Supreme Court's
ruling in FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life.7
This paper argues that the opinion by Chief Justice John
Roberts correctly chooses to protect free speech, rather than uphold
campaign finance restrictions at the expense of some
constitutionally protected speech. Roberts held in WRTL that there
is a distinction between express advocacy and issue advocacy, and
it is unconstitutional to preclude express advocacy at the expense
of issue advocacy.' An express advocacy ad is one intended to
influence through an appeal to vote for or against a candidate. 9
Express advocacy ads contain phrases such as "vote for," "elect,"
or "vote against."o An issue advocacy ad promotes a position on
an issue, such as judicial appointments, instead of the election of a
specific candidate." An issue advocacy ad may mention one or
more politicians, but the primary purpose of the ad is to advocate a
position on an issue. Roberts concluded the WRTL opinion by
stating, "[w]hen it comes to defining what speech qualifies as the
functional equivalent of express advocacy subject to such a ban ...
the Court should give the benefit of the doubt to speech, not
3id

4 540

U.S. 93 (2003).
FEC v. Wisconsin Right To Life, Inc. [hereinafter WRTL], 127 S. Ct. 2652,
2677 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring).
6Id. at 2666.
7 127 S. Ct. 2652 (2007).
8

WRTL, 127 S. Ct. at 2659.

9 Buckley

v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44-45 (1976).
44 n.52.
I WRTL, 127 S. Ct. at 2667.
'0 Id. at
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censorship."l 2
Thus, given the choice, Roberts argues the
government must err on the side of too much political speech.13
The Internet provides for practically unlimited speech, as the
barrier to entry is low, and unlike television and radio, space on the
Internet is unlimited. The restrictions in section 203 of BCRA do
not limit newspapers, so these limitations should not be placed on
television and radio advertisements.14 No special clause giving
preference to print media over other technological means of
communication exists in the Constitution. Instead, more accurate,
timely, and accessible disclosure information as to who is making
the donations should be required. To solve the "express advocacy"
versus "issue advocacy" dilemma, the disclosure requirements
should apply equally to both forms of advocacy.
Part II of this paper will focus on the ramifications of section
203 of BCRA, before the WRTL decision. Part III will discuss the
facts surrounding the WRTL decision. Part IV will analyze the
arguments for why this decision was proper. Part V will look
critically at the decision and contrast the arguments made in Part
IV. Finally, Part VI will discuss the post-WRTL world, how the
Court's decision may affect the 2008 election, and what changes
should be made to our campaign finance laws in the future,
including those being considered by the FEC.
II. BCRA SECTION 203 PRE- WRTL
BCRA is the federal election campaign law that regulates the
financing of federal political campaigns. One of its key provisions
bans corporations and unions from spending general treasury funds
in federal elections in the time immediately preceding a primary or
general election. Shortly after President Bush signed BCRA,
Republican Senator Mitch McConnell" filed a court challenge
arguing that major portions of the Act, including section 203, were
facially unconstitutional violations of the First Amendment of the
12

Id at 2674.

13

Id. at 2659.

Id. at 2660.
Senator Mitch McConnell (KY-R) has since been elected the U.S. Senate
Minority Leader.
14

1
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U.S. Constitution both for being overbroad and underinclusive."
In the unanimous portion of McConnell, the Court held that
making a distinction between "express advocacy" and "issue
advocacy" is not constitutionally required,1 and that within thirty
days of a primary or sixty days of a general election, issue
advocacy is the "functional equivalent of express advocacy.""
The Court went so far as to say that it was acceptable for some
legally protected ads were prohibited, because a vast majority of
the ads to be express advocacy ads and therefore excludable.' 9 The
standard per McConnell thus appeared to be an absolute bar on
corporations or unions from using general treasury funds on any
advertising that mentioned a candidate running for federal office.
The intent of the ad and its timing as it may relate to the legislative
calendar were considered irrelevant. Even whether a federal
candidate was running unopposed was considered irrelevant.20
Speech was substantially chilled.
As a result of the McConnell Court's denial of this facial
challenge, corporations and unions could not air political
advertisements on television or radio leading up to the primary and
general elections in 2004 or 2006.2 The system was open to an asapplied challenge, but the risks of ignoring the law included
criminal penalties.22 Meanwhile, "527 organizations" were free
to spend wildly. In 2004, the two dozen individuals who gave the
most money to 527 organizations donated $142 million, which
could be spent by the organizations at will. 24 As Justice Antonin
Scalia noted in his concurring opinion in WRTL, section 203 did
not regulate these groups.25 The system thus permitted some
See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 204 (2003).
204-05.
'8 Id at 206.
19Id at 207.
20 FEC v. Wisconsin Right To Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2663 (2007).
21 Id at 2662.
17 Id. at

22

23

Id at 2666.
26 U.S.C. § 527 (2002) (Unregulated private political organizations named

for the section of the U.S. tax code, pursuant to which they are organized.).
24 WRTL, 127 S. Ct. at 2686 (Scalia, J., concurring).
25 Id. at 2686 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia was joined
by Justices
Anthony M. Kennedy and Clarence Thomas.
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groups to be unfettered in running express advocacy ads, while
precluding other groups from airing television and radio ads that
were legitimate issue advocacy ads.26
FEC V.WISCoNsIN RIGHT To LIFE- THE DECISION
In the summer of 2004, Life was airing television ads calling
for Senators Russ Feingold and Herb Kohl to stop the Democrats'
filibuster against President Bush's judicial nominees and to give
them an up-or-down vote in the Senate. 27 Both senators had a
record of filibustering many of President Bush's judicial
nominees. 28 On August 15, thirty days before the Democratic
primary, Life had to stop airing the ads using their general treasury
funds, or else risk the prospect of criminal penalties. At that time,
section 203 of BRCA still prohibited corporations and labor unions
from advertising by any means of "electioneering communication"
in which the groups referred to a candidate running for federal
office. 29 This prohibition went into effect within thirty days of a
primary election and sixty days of a general election.o In this
case, Life had to stop advertising thirty days before Senator
Feingold's uncontested primary race."' Life's ability to be heard
on the issue of judicial nominees was suspended for the next three
months.3 Two election cycles later, in June 2007, the Supreme
Court ruled section 203 unconstitutional, so far as it was applied to
Life's advertisements and the use of general treasury funds by
III.

Id at 2670 (The Roberts opinion in WRTL found the Life ads to be issue
advocacy. In these ads, Life called on Senators Feingold and Kohl to vote for
cloture, thus giving the president's judicial nominees an up-or-down vote in
front of the full Senate.).
27 Id at 2660.
28 News Release, REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE, Party Of Nine
Becomes Party Of No, http://www.gop.com/News/Read.aspx?ID=5386 (Apr.
22, 2005) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
29WRTL, 127 S. Ct. at 2660. (Electioneering communication is defined in the
statute as "any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication.").
26

3

See id. at 2663.

Id. at 2661 (Section 203 of BRCA excludes corporations and unions from
advertising thirty days before a primary, and sixty days before a general
election. The sixty days started immediately following the September primary.).
32
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corporations and unions for "issue advocacy." The result, a 5-4
decision, brought forward three different views of where corporate
communication under section 203 of the BCRA stands. 3
While arguing the Court was not overruling the McConnell
decision," Chief Justice Roberts was joined by Justice Alito in
advocating a "new" standard by which corporate ads should be
judged.3 5 The standard holds, "[A] court should find that an ad is
the functional equivalent of express advocacy only if the ad is
susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal
to vote for or against a specific candidate.""6 Roberts argued this
test37 is most appropriate because if intent was a consideration
there could be a situation where an ad by one group would be
constitutionally protected; whereas the identical ad could bring
criminal charges against another group.38

3 See generally id (Roberts opinion arguing for issue versus express
advocacy test; Scalia arguing for the entire BCRA section to be ruled
unconstitutional; Souter dissenting and arguing McConnell has been reversed,
giving corporate communications free reign to advertise with minimal
limitation).
34
Id at 2674 (Roberts stated that McConnell is not being overruled because:
"McConnell held that express advocacy of a candidate or his opponent by a
corporation shortly before an election may be prohibited, along with the
functional equivalent of such express advocacy. We have no occasion to
revisit that determination today. But when it comes to defining what speech
qualifies as the functional equivalent of express advocacy subject to such a
ban ... we give the benefit of the doubt to speech, not censorship.").
3 See id at 2658.
36 Id. at 2667.
37 Id. at 2666. Cf McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 206 (2003) (Critics
disagree with this test because they argue the line between express advocacy and
issue advocacy is illusory in the months leading up to an election.).
38 WRTL, 127 S. Ct. at 2666 (Scalia, J., concurring) (Hypothetically, the U.S.
Senate is debating a Medicare bill that Senators Dole and Burr are against. The
AARP, a non-profit, non-partisan organization for men and women over fifty
years of age, runs a radio ad criticizing both senators for opposing this bill. The
intent is to pressure the senators to change their minds and vote for this bill. The
AARP otherwise could not care whether either senator was re-elected. Thus, the
intent would be considered "good" and thus the ad would be permissible. Under
the same scenario, if the AFL-CIO ran this identical ad, they could potentially
face criminal charges because labor unions traditionally support Democrats, thus
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In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia argued that section
203 "bans vast amounts of political advocacy indistinguishable
from hitherto protected speech."3 9 He argued that the prohibition
in section 203 should be ruled altogether unconstitutional, thereby
reversing the Court's decision in McConnell.4 0 The dissent,
written by Justice Souter,41 argued that the Roberts opinion had in
fact reversed McConnell, but simply refused to acknowledge this
fact.4 2 Justice Souter argued the Court made the correct decision in
McConnell when they allowed express advocacy, or its functional
equivalent, to be banned within the statute's time frame.4 3
Whereas Chief Justice Roberts concluded that the Life
advertisements include legitimate issue advocacy,44 the dissent
found that these ads should be subject to the regulations held
constitutional in McConnell.4 5
IV. WRTL - THE ROBERTS OPINION
"[T]he First Amendment requires us to err on the side of
protecting political speech rather than suppressing it," Chief
Justice Roberts wrote in WRTL. 46 The ruling in McConnell v.
FEC, however, did just the opposite. 47 Rather than err on the side
their intent may be to remove Republican Senators' Dole and Burr from office,
and thus this intent may be considered "bad.").
39 Id

at 2684.

Id. (Justice Scalia argues McConnell should be overruled, but disagrees
with the dissent that the Roberts WRTL opinion does in fact accomplish this
goal. Scalia considers the Roberts opinion as being overly broad and does not
go far enough). See also McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
41 See WRTL, 127 S. Ct. 2652. (Justices John Paul Stevens, Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, and Stephen Breyer joined Justice David Souter in his dissent.).
42 Id. at 2704 (Souter, J., dissenting).
40

43 d
44

Id at 2667.

45 Id at 2698 (Souter, J., dissenting).
46

Id at 2659.

47 It is important to note the dynamics of the Court changed in the time

between McConnell and WRTL. Justice Samuel Alito, who joined one of the
plurality opinions, was appointed by President George W. Bush to replace
Justice Sandra Day O'Conner. While Justice Alito is considered a conservative,
Justice O'Conner was considered a more moderate member of the Court. Bill
Mears, Alito Sworn in as Nation's 110th Supreme CourtJustice, CNN, Feb. 1,
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of free speech, the majority in McConnell accepted the possibility
of limiting some constitutionally protected speech in the name of
eliminating "express advocacy."48 In WRTL, Chief Justice Roberts
rejected the majority's view in McConnell that it is unnecessary to
differentiate between "express advocacy" and "issue advocacy."4 9
While express advocacy is designed to explicitly support or reject a
candidate; issue advocacy is focused on policy."o As Chief Justice
Roberts correctly notes, candidates, and especially incumbents, run
on their record and are tied to their votes on particular legislation."'
While it may be appropriate to limit express advocacy to ensure
fairness, debate over today's political issues should not end simply
because an election is impending. If anything, greater debate
should be encouraged as voters are gearing up to go to the polls. 5 2
2006, http://www.cnn.com/2006/POLITICS/01/31/alito/index.html (on file with
the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
48 McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S.
93, 207 (2003).
49 WRTL, 127 S. Ct. at 2659. The WRTL decision by the Court was widely
heralded by many groups, and made for some unlikely bedfellows. It could be
argued that you have found a problem when the ACLU, the AFL-CIO, and the
NRA all agree a law is bad. (For the ACLU's stance see Brief Amicus Curiae of
the ACLU In Support of Appellee, FEC v. Wisconsin Right To Life, Inc. 127 S.
Ct. 2652 (2007) (Nos. 06-969 and 06-970), http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/
scotus/fec v wisconsinrtl aclu amicus.pdf (Nos. 06-969 and 06-970) (last
visited Nov. 17, 2007) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law &.
Technology) [hereinafter ACLU Amicus]; for the AFL-CIO's stance see Edwin
J. Feulner, Op-Ed., Court Wisely Permits More Issue Ads in Weeks Before Vote,

CH. SUN TIMES, July 4, 2007, at 23, available at 2007 WLNR 12713019 (on
file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology), WRTL, 127 S. Ct. at
2674; for the NRA's stance see Sandy Froman, DismantlingCampaign Finance
Reform: Restoring Your Free Speech, TOWNHALL.COM,

June 25, 2007,

http://www.townhall.com/columnists/SandyFroman/2007/06/25/dismantling
campaign finance reform restoring our free speech (on file with the North
Carolina Journal of Law & Technology)). In the instance of the ACLU, they
were prohibited from running television ads, even though they were already
required to obey the non-partisan tax-exempt status rules, and did not expressly
encourage voting for or against a specific candidate. ACLUAmicus, supra at 2.
On the other hand, maybe a law that upsets conservative and liberal special
interest groups is actually accomplishing its intended effect.
50 WRTL, 127 S. Ct. at 2667.
5i Id. at 2659 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 42 (1976)).
52 The United States is fighting a global war on terror in Iraq, Afghanistan,
and other parts of the world. Social Security is scheduled to run out, though
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In FirstNationalBank of Boston v. Belotti the Court noted that
"The freedom of speech . . . guaranteed by the Constitution
embraces at the least the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully
all matters of public concern without previous restraint or fear of
subsequent punishment."" If the legality of an advertisement is
based upon the intent of the organization, the effect will be to chill
free speech.54 The Supreme Court has rejected a test based on
intent-and-effect time and again." The possibility of criminal
sanctions if the finder of fact decides the intent of the speech was
express rather than issue-based advocacy effectively puts a halt to
all speech." Thus, the Court is right to reject any test that has such
a consequence.
Under the Court's WRTL ruling, groups like the ACLU and
other organizations have clear direction from the judiciary when
advertising in the future. It is true that the new standard from the
Roberts opinion essentially shatters section 203 of the BCRA.
However, section 203 significantly curtails issue advocacy, which
is protected by the First Amendment. As the ACLU argued in its
amicus curiae brief, the year preceding a presidential election is a
time of significant legislative debate." Corporations and unions
have a right for the public to hear their message. As long as there
is a strong dose of issue advocacy in the advertisement, the Court
has properly said they ought to receive the benefit of the doubt.

how soon is hotly contested. We have a shortage of judges on the federal bench;
and illegal immigration is a significant problem with few viable solutions on the
table. These are only a few of the issues in today's political debate, and only
through discussion will we find politically and socially viable solutions.
WRTL, 127 S. Ct. at 2666 (quoting First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,
435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
54

Id at 2665.

Id (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 43-44 (1976) (Rejecting test for
distinguishing between discussions of issues and candidates)); see also New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) ("[D]ebate on public
issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open."); M. Redish, Money
Talks: Speech, Economic Power, and the Values of Democracy 91 (2001) ("[A]
speaker's motivation is entirely irrelevant to the question of constitutional
protection.").
5 See supranote 38 and accompanying text.
ACLU Amicus, supra note 49 at 10.
5
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V. A SETBACK FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCE AND FREE SPEECH

The day after the Court issued its opinion in WRTL, the New
York Times published an editorial entitled "Three Bad Rulings."5
The Times' Editorial Board decried the ruling as reversing
McConnell and section 203, which had been constructed "to
prevent corporations and labor unions from circumventing the ban
on their spending in federal campaigns by bankrolling phony 'issue

ads."

59

The dismissal of the Court's differentiation between "express
advocacy" and "issue advocacy" advertisements is the crux of the
objection to the Court's ruling. The New York Times and groups
like Democracy 21 argue that while there may be a difference
between "express advocacy" and "issue advocacy" advertisements,
the difference is negligible leading up to an election, as both types
of ads have the same intended effect, which is to influence voters."o
Thus "issue ads" serve as the functional equivalent to "express
ads." 6' The dissent argues the political advocacy banned in section
203 was practically indistinguishable from any protected speech,62
Editorial, Three Bad Rulings, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2007, at A20.
[d
60 See id.; see also Statement by Democracy 21 President Fred Wertheimer
on
Supreme Court Decision Today in WRTL Case, June 25, 2007, available at
http://www.democracy21.org/index.asp?Type=B_PR&SEC=%/7b1772BBCD191F-4076-AAEF-2CO61BACBOEC%7d&DE=%7bE10F2EDA-C4F2-402C947D-30B1D7736C81%7d (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law &
58

59

Technology) [hereinafter Statement].

Democracy 21 is a non-profit, non-

partisan watchdog organization focused on campaign finance reform that
disfavors soft money being spent on elections. Democracy 21, About Us,
http://www.democracy2l.org/index.asp?Type=B_PR&SEC={3E522118-9BCF4129-A19D-A568670FEBBF} (last visited Nov. 17, 2007) (on file with the
North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
6i See supra notes 40-51 and accompanying text. This opinion was also
supported in Brief Amicus Curiae of The Center for Governmental Studies In
Support of the Appellees, McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003) (No. 02-1674
et al.), available at http://faculty.l1s.edu/hasen/cgs-amicus.pdf [hereinafter CGS
Amicus].
62 WRTL, 127 S. Ct. at 2684; cf id. at 2659 (stating that "practically
indistinguishable" is not the same as "indistinguishable" and that it is better to
err on the side of too much protection for speech than to preclude
constitutionally protected free speech.)
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and thus it was appropriate to uphold a ban of this speech within
the timeframe allotted by the statute.63
The Center for Governmental Studies ("CGS")64 asserts
that section 203 provides a bright-line test of what can and cannot
be advertised as well as a timeline for permissible advertising. 65
This bright-line test advocated by the CGS and supported in
McConnell is necessary to maintain effective campaign finance
laws and to prevent campaign finance abuse.66 This sentiment is
echoed by the dissent in WRTL. 67 Specifically, Justice Souter
noted that no evidence suggests the bright-line rule, set by section
203 and affirmed in McConnell, is difficult to apply.68 Thus, the
only question for Justice Souter is whether the bright-line test is
politically viable in application.69
Before this bright-line test there was the "magic words"
test. Justice Souter argued that, following the majority opinion in
WRTL, the "magic words" standard is once again in effectstating: "The Chief Justice thus effectively reinstates the same
toothless magic words criterion of regulable electioneering that led
Congress to enact BCRA in the first place." 0 Quoting from
McConnell, Justice Souter also argued:
The presence or absence of magic words cannot meaningfully
distinguish electioneering speech, which is prohibitable, "from a true
issue ad," we said, since ads that "eschew the use of magic words ...
are no less clearly intended to influence the election." We thus found
"little difference" . . . between an ad that urged viewers to 'vote against

Jane Doe' and one that condemned Jane Doe's record on a particular

6, Id. at

2703 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Ctr. for Governmental Studies; http://www.cgs.org/ (last visited
Sept. 26,
2007) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
See CGS Amicus, supra note 61 at 20-21.
64

66

See id.

WRTL, 127 S. Ct. at 2704 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id
69 See WRTL, 127 S. Ct. at 2674, 2684 (Scalia, J., concurring). The majority
opinion does not question the viability of applying this bright-line test. The
objection is in the use of this test, arguing that it improperly infringes on a
corporation's First Amendment right to free speech.
70 Id. at 2702 (Souter, J., dissenting).
67
68
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issue before exhorting viewers to 'call Jane Doe and tell her what you
think.' 7

Democracy 21 correctly notes that by avoiding the "magic
words,"72 corporations and labor unions will be significantly
better-protected as a result of the ruling in WRTL." Democracy 21
thus argues that the WRTL ruling opens the floodgates, allowing
corporations and unions to pour money into the 2008 election,
thereby increasing the likelihood of corruption.7 4
VI. A LOOK AHEAD TO 2008 AND CHANGES BEING CONSIDERED

Following the WRTL ruling, the FEC announced two
alternative proposals on electioneering communications."
The
first proposal allows corporations and unions "to use their general
treasury funds to pay for electioneering communications that
qualify for the exemption the Supreme Court described, but would
require financial disclosures to the FEC." 6 The second proposal,
Id. at 2695-96 (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 193 (2003)).
Id. at 2667 (citing McConnell, 540 U.S. at 127). These words include "vote
for," "elect," "defeat," and any other word or phrase explicitly advocating the
election or defeat of a federal candidate. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44 n.52
(1976).
See Statement, supra note 60.
74 See id The problem with this assumption is that it implies that the system
under the BCRA was working. Recent news stories, however, would indicate
otherwise. Congressman Duke Cunningham pled guilty to bribery, tax evasion,
and conspiracy. Ed Henry & Mark Preston, Congressman resigns after bribery
plea,
CNN.COM,
Nov.
28,
2005,
http://www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/I 1/28/cunningham/ (on file with the
North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology). Bob Ney pled guilty to
conspiracy and making false statements. Andrea Koppel & Deidre Walsh, Ohio
Congressman linked to Abramoff resigns, CNN.coM, Nov. 3, 2006,
http://www.cnn.com/2006/POLITICS/ 11/03/ney.resignation/index.html?iref-ne
wssearch (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
William Jefferson ("indicted . . . by a federal grand jury on 16 corruption-related
felony counts") has not been deterred from taking bribes because of the new
campaign finance laws. David Johnston and Jeff Zeleny, CongressmanSought
Bribes, Indictment Says, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2007, at Al, A19.
75 Electioneering Communications, 72 Fed. Reg. 50,261 50262 (proposed
Aug. 31, 2007) (to be codified at 11 C.F.R pt. 100, 104, and 114).
7 News Release, FEC Issues Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on
ElectioneeringCommunications,http://www.fec.gov/press/press2007/
71
72
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which is far broader, exempts any communication qualifying under
WRTL from both funding restrictions and reporting requirements. ?
The route chosen by the FEC will largely dictate the impact of
WRTL in the 2008 election cycle. If the FEC adopts the first
proposal, it will essentially be trying to faithfully uphold the spirit
of the BCRA but will largely be ignoring what the Court held in
WRTL. This proposal "would incorporate the new exemption into
the rules prohibiting the use of corporate and labor organization
funds for electioneering communications."7 8 However, the point
of the majority opinion in WRTL was that the ads in question were
not actually electioneering communications.7 9 Thus, the problem
cannot be solved simply by making an exemption to the definition
of electioneering communication, since the Court ruled in WRTL
that the ads were never actually electioneering communications.
Instead, the Roberts WRTL opinion held that Life's ads were
legitimate issue advocacy ads, and thus section 203 was overbroad
by including them.
Part of the reason the FEC is struggling with this issue is
because the definition of "functional equivalent of express
advocacy" is unclear. While the Court said that the BCRA could
limit this speech in McConnell," the Court has all but done away
with this idea in WRTL. If the definition of express advocacy is
communications that are "susceptible of no reasonable
interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or against a
specific candidate,"" what remains to be its "functional
equivalent"?
The second proposal offered by the FEC would permit
corporations and unions to be just as secretive and unaccountable
as 527s have been over the past two election cycles. While this
20070823nprm.shtml (Aug. 23, 2007) (on file with the North Carolina Journal
of Law & Technology).
77 See Electioneering Communications, supra note 75 at 50,264.
Id. at 50,262.
79 FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2667 (2007).
s0 See generally McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 104 (2003) (holding on a
78

facial challenge to BCRA that express and issue advocacy were substantial
equivalents within the timeframe specified in Section 203 of the statute).
81 WRTL, 127 S. Ct. at 2667.
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would, in fact, put the FEC in accordance with the Court's ruling,
it would move far away from the original purpose of the BCRA,
which is to prevent corruption and take some of the soft money out
of politics. 8 2 However, of the two proposals, this is the one the
FEC should adopt. The FEC must recognize it cannot adopt a
proposal that completely twists the Court's ruling. The Court did
not say that the ads in question were legitimate election ads; it held
Life's ads were not in fact election ads and thus must be afforded
the First Amendment's protection without limitation.
The campaign finance system in place under the BCRA is far
from perfect. The goals are to take money and corruption out of
politics, yet both of these goals have failed." Both the Roberts
opinion and the dissent in WRTL recognized preventing corruption
as a legitimate and compelling state interest. The restrictions
under section 203 did not further this interest. It is difficult to
argue that by precluding corporations and unions from advertising,
but allowing 527s to operate in secrecy and spend unlimited
amounts of cash, corruption is somehow eliminated. Instead of
silencing corporations and unions, the campaign finance laws
should focus on reporting. In an age of high-speed Internet,
requiring corporations, unions, PACs, 527s, political parties, and
of course candidates to post meticulous records regarding the
source of their money in a timely manner84 will go much further in
keeping corruption out of politics. Let the voters decide if they
mind that twenty-four individuals donated $142 million in one
election cycle.15 As the WRTL dissent noted, a Governor's BlueRibbon Commission on Campaign Finance Reform in Wisconsin
reported:
The explosive growth of campaign-based advocacy, without even
disclosure of its activities and funding sources, poses a grave risk to the
integrity of elections. It has created a two-tiered campaign process: one,
based in candidates and political parties, which is tightly regulated and
controlled; the other, based in interest group activity under the guise of
See id. at 2672 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 45, 96 (1976)).
supranotes 24, 74 and accompanying text.
84 For example, a law requiring all donations to be reported within
twenty-four
hours of receipt in a centralized online database could be one option for ensuring
full disclosure.
82

83 See

85See supra note 24 and accompanying
text.
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"issue advocacy" but actually quite clearly election-focused, which lies
beyond accountability."

Plenty of wealthy individuals are spending a lot of money on
elections every two years. The WRTL ruling is not a defeat for the
average American, it is a victory. This ruling allows corporations
and unions to once again be heard, and it counter-balances the
special interest groups that have had free reign over the
microphone in the last two election cycles.
A proposal to meet the constitutional demands set forth in
WRTL and keep part of the BRCA's objectives intact would
require the FEC to combine the two proposals. First, the Court
ruled that the ads in question were not considered "electioneering
communications" and thus cannot be limited under the BCRA.
This recognition, which is part of the second proposal, must be
preserved. Disclosure, as advocated in the first proposal, is most
prevalent in preserving the goals of BCRA. Instead, requiring full
disclosure on the Internet by all advocacy groups participating in
the political process, whether they are 527s, unions, corporations,
or individuals, would give people the most information regarding
the source of the money they are receiving." Spending limits may
still be applied, but they must be applied equally and must exclude
issue advocacy. The voting public will then be capable of
accessing this information and assessing how much weight to give
a specific advertisement.
VII. CONCLUSION

While Chief Justice Roberts refused to explicitly reverse
McConnell," it seems that for all practical purposes, McConnell
has, in fact, been reversed. The WRTL ruling essentially brings us

1 WRTL, 127 S. Ct. at 2695 n.10 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Governor's
Blue-Ribbon Commission on Campaign Finance Reform, State of Wisconsin:
Report of the Commission, available at http://www.lafollette.wisc.edu/
campaign reform/fmal.htm).
1 This may require Congress to amend the
BCRA.
" See WRTL, 127 S. Ct. at 2674. In their concurrence, Justices Scalia,
Kennedy, and Thomas argued that the Court should have explicitly reversed
McConnell.
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back to a "magic words" test.8 9 With the fundamental right of
speech at stake, the Court must apply strict scrutiny.9 o In analyzing
the three Life ads in question, the dissent spoke unequivocally that,
"[g]iven these facts, it is beyond all reasonable debate that the ads
are constitutionally subject to regulation under McConnell."9 '
Justice Roberts argued just as vehemently that "[Life]'s three ads
are plainly not the functional equivalent of express advocacy." 92 If
the members of the U.S. Supreme Court, some of this nation's
most sound legal minds, cannot agree whether an advertisement
violates the First Amendment, it is best to let the words be spoken.
As Chief Justice Roberts so aptly argues, it is no solution to err on
the side of suppressing free speech. 93

89 Roberts explains this test another way: "[A] court should find that an ad is
the functional equivalent of express advocacy only if the ad is susceptible of no
reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific
candidate." Id. at 2667.
90 Id. at 2664 ("Because BCRA section 203 burdens political speech, it is
subject to strict scrutiny").
9' Id. at 2698 (Souter, J., dissenting).
92 Id. at 2667.
93 Id. at 2659.

